The landscape is an ideal spatial extent for managing forests because many ecological processes and disturbances occur on such scales. Moreover, landscape-level decision-making processes can improve the efficiency of forest management, as when many owners of small parcels increase the economy of scale of their operations by jointly hiring labor or selling products. Despite the potential benefits of managing at the landscape level, cooperation on management activities across property boundaries is rare among private landowners and poorly understood. We used a comparative case study approach to explain cooperative management among eight sets of individual private forest landowners in the Pacific Northwest and Upper Midwest, USA. We characterized how private forest owners cooperated on management and the outcomes they associated with cooperating, and we identified factors that influenced cooperation. We investigated whether cooperative management among private landowners may be constrained by social risks and whether formal institutions may be needed to facilitate cooperation. In the cases we investigated, owners jointly planned and implemented integrated management decisions on their collective forest properties. They perceived a number of beneficial social and ecological outcomes of cooperation. The key factors that fostered the emergence and continuity of cooperative management included shared concern, especially about risks to their properties and the health of their forests; preexisting networks; trust; external expertise and resources; local leadership; and formal institutions. These factors are consistent with collective action and social exchange theory. Our findings shed light on social conditions that foster cooperative landscape management.
Introduction
Managing ecosystems at landscape scales is vital, since many ecological processes and disturbances occur over large spatial extents (Brunckhorst, 2011; Forman, 1995; Forman & Godron, 1986; Phillips, 1998; Wu, 2012) . Landscape management is especially relevant in forests where management challenges, such as wildfires, invasive plant incursions, and pest and disease outbreaks, are a function of conditions and processes that interact across large areas. Since landscapes are expansive, they often extend across multiple property ownerships, requiring cooperation among property owners for management. Individual private forest landowners (i.e., small woodland owners or family forest owners) are particularly important for cooperative landscape management efforts. Their lands have a major impact on the connectivity of forests and many ecological conditions and processes, as they occupy approximately one-third of total forest area nationwide and are interspersed around public lands (Kittredge, 2005) . However, their parcels are typically quite small (approximately half are 100 acres in size or less), and their land use goals and approaches are typically multifaceted (Butler, 2008) , both of which can make management by this group inefficient compared to industrial private or public landowners. Nevertheless, cooperation (e.g., jointly planning and implementing management) has the potential to increase the economy of scale of their operations and, potentially, the collective impact of their practices (Amacher, Conway, & Sullivan, 2003; Blinn, Jakes, & Sakai, 2007; Gass, Rickenbach, Schulte, & Zeuli, 2009; Goldman, Thompson, & Daily, 2007; Kittredge, 2005; Schulte, Rickenbach, & Merrick, 2008; Vokoun, Amacher, Sullivan, & Wear, 2010; Wolf & Hufnagl-Eichiner, 2007) .
Despite the potential ecological and social benefits of cooperating on forest management on landscape scales, such approaches are uncommon in practice among individual private landowners (Erickson, Ryan, & De Young, 2002; Gill, Klepeis, & Chisholm, 2010; Kittredge, 2005) . Although private forest landowners share information and equipment and coordinate within formal organizations, they rarely make and implement integrated management decisions (Kittredge, 2005) . The lack of cooperation despite potential benefits has prompted substantial research interest in cooperative land management efforts involving private landowners (Finley et al., 2006; Jacobson, 2002; Kittredge, 2005; Rickenbach, 2004; Wolf & Hufnagl-Eichiner, 2007) . However, only a handful of empirical studies have investigated cooperative management that occurs directly between private forest owners (Ferranto et al., 2013; Fischer & Charnley, 2012; Meadows, Herbohn, & Emtage, 2013) . As a result, suitable models of cooperation among individual private landowners and the factors that enable and constrain cooperation among owners are poorly understood. This knowledge gap may impede policy efforts to foster landscape management and limit scientific understanding of cooperation among individuals in private property rights systems.
This study seeks to increase understanding of the social conditions that foster landscape management through cooperation among individual private property owners. We examined cases of cooperative forest management among individual private forest landowners in the US Pacific Northwest and Upper Midwest to investigate the following questions: (1) In what ways do private forest owners cooperate on forest management across property boundaries? (2) What types of beneficial outcomes do private forest owners perceive from cooperation? (3) What factors explain cooperation?
Background
Cooperation refers to individuals organizing and governing themselves to obtain joint benefits (Ostrom, 1990) . In broad terms, cooperation can be considered as a spectrum of behaviors that range from communicating with others about shared interests to engaging in activities that help others, including sharing resources and work (Yaffee, 1998) . Cooperation is considered crucial for solving collective action problems, such as the stewardship of common pool resources (e.g., air, water, fish, wildlife, and forest stocks). Collective action theory (CAT) suggests that individuals will cooperate when: (1) Cooperative strategies exist that can reduce the risk of harm to the resource that people value; (2) People have the capacity to participate in such strategies; (3) People understand that uncoordinated strategies will harm a resource (or that acting collectively is better for the resource than acting independently); (4) People expect that if they change their behavior, other group members will, too; and (5) People perceive that the benefits of cooperation will exceed the costs (Ostrom, 1992) . Other psychosocial conditions that foster cooperation among individuals include the presence of common goals and motivations, perceptions of common problems (including risks), mutually understood expectations about each other's behavior (trust), reputations for being trustworthy, and norms of reciprocity (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 1998; Pretty, 2003) . Structural variables are also important: small, homogeneous groups of people who are embedded in preexisting social networks and who share similar levels of dependence on a resource are more likely to cooperate around the management of that resource (Ostrom, 1998) . Policy environments, land tenure arrangements, and power relations must also be conducive to cooperation (Ostrom, 1990) . The less conducive a social and policy environment is to cooperation, the higher the transaction costs of cooperating and the lower the likelihood of collectively acting to solve natural resource problems (Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002) .
Social exchange theory (SET) provides additional insights into the factors that give rise to cooperation by distinguishing among the resources that can be successfully exchanged between people in different types of social relationships. According to social exchange theory, people cooperate on the basis of expectations of reciprocity formed through interdependency, folk beliefs (e.g., "it will all come out in the wash"), and norms; they also cooperate on the basis of negotiated rules formalized in agreements (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000) . SET posits that the nature of what is being exchanged when people cooperate has bearing on the type of relationship through which people cooperate. According to SET, people typically exchange resources that are symbolic and person-specific (e.g., favors) through interpersonal relationships and resources that are more tangible and generic (e.g., goods) through formal relationships backed with rules (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) . SET suggests that risks to cooperation develop when parties in interpersonal relationships engage in transactions of an economic nature (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) . Under such conditions of "transactional mismatch," the risk of failing to meet expectations of reciprocity is high when assurances are not provided by formal agreements (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Molm, Schaefer, & Collett, 2009) .
Most empirical research on cooperation among individual private forest landowners has documented landowners sharing information, techniques, experiences, and advice with one another; sharing equipment and machinery for harvesting, road building and access; or collectively marketing wood products to achieve a more advantageous position in the marketplace; but nevertheless operating independently in the management of their land (e.g., (Kittredge, 2003; Rickenbach, 2009; Rickenbach, 2004; Rickenbach & Reed, 2002; Toledo, Kreuter, Sorice, & Taylor, 2014; Wagner, Kreuter, Kaiser, & Wilkins, 2007) ). Cooperation on management-making integrated management decisions and implement them in the context of their surrounding natural, cultural, and economic resources-is uncommon Kittredge (2005) . Studies of cooperation among private forest landowners support some of the factors theorized to foster cooperation according to SET and CAT. Social capital, for example, has been identified as an important condition for cooperation because of the norms of reciprocity and trust it promotes (Gass et al., 2009; Lauber & Brown, 2006; Meadows et al., 2013; Rickenbach & Reed, 2002; Wagner et al., 2007) . Shared understanding of risks to forest health and timber and land values has also been documented as a contributing factor (Ferranto et al., 2013; Fischer & Charnley, 2012; Gass et al., 2009; Kittredge, 2005; Rickenbach & Reed, 2002) . Additionally, leadership is a factor that can promote cooperation among private landowners (Knight, Cowling, Difford, & Campbell, 2010; Larsen, Foulkes, Sorenson, & Thompson, 2011; Meadows et al., 2013) . On the other hand, strong ideals of independence and strong traditions of property individualism can constrain cooperative forest management activity (Fischer & Charnley, 2012) , as can weak relationships with neighbors and concerns about loss of privacy and autonomy over land management decision-making (Finley et al., 2006; Meadows et al., 2013) . Misalignment of goals, low levels of trust, and uneven power relations between landowners also pose barriers to cooperation (Ferranto et al., 2013; Fischer & Charnley, 2012; Gass et al., 2009) , as do lack of knowledge, experience, confidence, skill, and ability (Meadows et al., 2013) .
Some research suggests that formal institutions and policy tools are necessary to foster cooperative management among private landowners (Ferranto et al., 2013; Fischer & Charnley, 2012; Goldman et al., 2007; Rickenbach, Schulte, Kittredge, Labich, & Shinneman, 2011) . Indeed, most cooperation among private forest owners has occurred under the auspices of formal organizations, such as marketing cooperatives and nonprofit stewardship organizations (Kittredge, 2005; Meadows et al., 2013; Sobels, Curtis, & Lockie, 2001; Wolf & Hufnagl-Eichiner, 2007) . Research also suggests that external actors and policy tools may be critical to cooperative forest management among private landowners to reduce transaction costs (Meadows et al., 2013; Rickenbach et al., 2011) . However, designing such institutional interventions is complex, given the conflicts that often exist around goals, trust, and power relations between landowners and resource professionals (Ferranto et al., 2013; Fischer & Charnley, 2012; Gass et al., 2009 ). Moreover, private landowners' preferences for communicating and learning about management through interpersonal relationships rather than from experts and their reluctance to participate in formal programs and agreements also discourage cooperation facilitated by external actors (Fischer, Bliss, Ingemarson, Lidestav, & Lönnstedt, 2010) . Indeed, substantial research has found that private forest landowners prefer programs that facilitate cooperative management through peer networks (Meadows et al., 2013) . In response, scholars have proposed combinations of top-
